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Economic performance in Latin America in 2015 H2 was largely determined by the growing 
intensity of the recession in two countries that make up 45% of the region’s GDP, namely 
Brazil, where activity declined by 3.9% in 2015 overall, and Venezuela, where it fell by 
5.7%. Accordingly, GDP in the region receded by 0.4% in the year,1 the worst figure 
recorded since 2009. There were, however, major differences from one country to another. 
In Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico combined, GDP rose by 2.7% (see Table 1). Growth 
rates in Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Peru were higher than in 2014, while in Colombia the 
pace of growth slowed but it was still a robust 3.1%.
In 2015 Latin America continued to adjust to the decline in the terms of trade that began 
in 2011. A large part of that adjustment was made through exchange rate depreciation, in 
most countries as part of an orderly process. In some cases, however, the fact that it 
coincided with adverse internal factors made correction of imbalances difficult, 
exacerbating the recessionary pattern or sharply driving up inflation. In fact inflation 
surprised on the upside in most countries, requiring official interest rate rises, against a 
backdrop of moderately expansionary fiscal policies.
The outlook is complex for 2016, in view of the external environment (the year began with 
low growth among the region’s main trading partners) and the fiscal and external 
vulnerability displayed by some of the region’s economies. The need to redress the 
imbalances accumulated in recent years will continue to place a constraint on the 
contribution economic policies can make to recovery. Even in the countries with sounder 
fundamentals, lower public revenue as a result of the persistent decline in commodities 
prices, higher indebtedness in recent years or high inflation limit the room for manoeuvre 
for macroeconomic policies. On the more positive side, the significant adjustment in real 
exchange rates has restored some external competitiveness and should prompt a recovery 
in exports and a favourable shift in capital flows, especially towards the economies that 
display fewer vulnerabilities. In any event, in recent months there have been further 
downward revisions of forecasts for 2016 and GDP is expected to fall in the region for the 
second consecutive year (once more owing to declines in Brazil and Venezuela), for the 
first time in Latin America since the external debt crisis of 1982‑1983 (see Chart 1). In all 
the other countries except Peru the pace of growth is also expected to decelerate 
compared with 2015.
The structure of this Latin American report has changed compared with past editions. The 
second section will be devoted to the usual analysis of the economic situation in the 
region, but in more succinct form. It will now be followed by two thematic sections, 
providing a more detailed analysis of specific aspects that are either common to all the 
economies of Latin America or specific to a particular country. The recent inflation 
performance is the first of the two topics chosen for this report. The rise in prices in most 
of the region’s economies in 2015 was unexpected and was in contrast to the inflation 
performance in other emerging countries and regions. It is linked to a factor common to 
Latin America, namely exchange rate depreciation and its pass-through to prices. The 
third section analyses this effect in several of the countries that have an inflation-targeting 
Introduction
1  Weighted average GDP of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America-5: all the countries represented, except Argentina and Venezuela.
Latin America-4: Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
b Seasonally adjusted.
c 2014 inflation is calculated as the cumulative figure since December 2013.
d Four-quarter moving average.
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regime. Lastly, the fourth section reviews and places in context the recent economic policy 
changes made in Argentina and reviews the outlook and risks going forward.
Since the last Latin American report was published in October the world economy has 
underperformed expectations somewhat, in a setting marked by higher volatility in financial 
markets and sluggish trade flows. Among the main advanced economies, the pronounced 
slowdown in activity in the United States in 2015 Q4, which seems to have continued into 
2016 Q1, was particularly noteworthy, while in all other advanced economies the pace of 
growth generally steadied at moderate levels. The emerging economies continued to face 
major headwinds – the gradual economic slowdown in China, low commodities prices and 
the deterioration in investor sentiment in the financial markets – that have contributed to 
prolonging the slowdown in activity and there is no clear sign of any turning point in this 
respect. Against this backdrop, global economic growth forecasts have been revised 
down again and the balance of risks has continued to deteriorate.
In turn, in the international financial markets volatility has increased. On the one hand, the 
process to liberalise the capital account and increase the flexibility of the exchange rate in 
China continued to generate instability worldwide and prompted significant capital 
outflows from that country. Moreover, the continued decline in oil prices, down to 13-year 
lows in early 2016, triggered risk aversion in the financial markets that particularly affected 
the corporate sector in the major oil-producing and exporting countries. On the other 
hand, although the interest rate rise in the United States at the end of 2015 caused no 
notable turbulence in the emerging markets, as it was already largely factored in, doubts 
about the strength of the recovery in the United States, together with heightened instability 
in China and a further decline in oil prices, gave rise to another episode of high market 
stress at the start of 2016 that drove up the cost of borrowing for emerging economies 
once more. Since mid-February, as crude prices have recovered (up to over $40 per barrel 
of Brent), the expectations of monetary tightening in the United States have been put 
back, the Chinese financial markets have steadied and the ECB and the Bank of Japan 
have continued with their expansionary policies, the emerging markets have undergone a 
strong recovery, the continuity of which is difficult to assess.
Financial markets in Latin America performed in tandem, though with more marked 
fluctuations, chiefly as a result of the high weight of the oil companies as a percentage 
Recent economic 
performance in Latin 
America
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
FINANCIAL MARKET 
PERFORMANCE
SOURCES: IMF (WEO) y Consensus Forecasts.
a Consensus Forecasts projections.
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of the local stock markets and corporate credit risk indicators. Moreover, as many of 
those companies are State-owned, this fed through to sovereign risk. In effect, while the 
sovereign spread of the countries of the region that are least dependent on oil prices 
rose by 50  bp, the sovereign spread of those most dependent on oil prices rose by 
230 bp (see Chart 2).2
By country, it is interesting to note that the latest market upswing has had the most 
favourable impact on the countries with high vulnerabilities. For instance Brazil, where the 
stock market recovery, narrowing of sovereign spreads and, especially, exchange rate 
appreciation (12% against the dollar) since February have all been greater than in the other 
countries in the region, leading the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets to halt it. The reason for this marked improvement is the expected change in the 
political cycle, which is subject, in any event, to great uncertainty; all three leading credit 
rating agencies have placed Brazil’s sovereign rating below investment grade.
In both Colombia and Mexico the dependence of their external accounts and public 
finances on oil prices caused their market indicators to deteriorate severely, despite their 
sounder fundamentals. In Mexico the rapid response from the authorities (announcing a 
coordinated fiscal and monetary adjustment and subsequent financial support for PEMEX) 
smoothed the fall. In Argentina and Venezuela market performance was also conditioned 
by the political cycle. In Venezuela the sovereign spread remained above previous highs 
(3,000 bp), in a setting marked by a sharp increase in real, fiscal and external vulnerabilities 
and expectations of a default that did not materialise. The opposition win in the general 
election prompted the government to announce fiscal and exchange rate adjustment 
measures that to date have had negligible effects on the markets. By contrast, in Argentina 
and as analysed in detail in the last section of this article, the new economic policy stance 
following the election of the country’s new president gave rise to a substantial improvement 
in market perception.
In 2015 H2 the decline in capital flows that began in early 2014 continued. In effect, both 
portfolio inflows and inflows of foreign direct investment fell to their lowest levels since 
2011 and 2010, respectively (see Chart 3). In the region as a whole, gross portfolio inflows 
in 2015 amounted to $26.8 billion, almost $70 billion less than in 2014, as inflows to Mexico 
and Brazil declined. Gross direct investment inflows totalled $157 billion, some $17 billion 
less than in 2014, also owing to lower inflows to Brazil ($23 billion less), although direct 
investment inflows both to Mexico and Argentina grew in 2015. The lower level of capital 
inflows was reflected in foreign exchange reserves, which fell in all countries in the region 
from June 2015, reaching all-time lows in Ecuador, Argentina and Venezuela. More recently, 
since March 2016, capital inflows to emerging markets, including those in Latin America, 
have recovered significantly.
Fixed income issuance in 2015 Q4 dropped to levels not recorded since early 2009 (see 
Chart  3). Brazil made no placements in international markets between June 2015 and 
March 2016, while issuance in Mexico was almost 75% lower than in the same period of 
2014. Moreover, international issuance was not replaced by local issuance, which also 
declined in 2015 Q4, down to $4.5 billion. In 2016 Q1 issuance in international markets 
regained momentum, driven both by sovereign and euro issues (55% and 42% of the total, 
respectively).
2  Excluding Venezuela, the increase would be 110 bp.
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SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a Latin American, Asian and Eastern European rates have been constructed by adding the US 10-year government bond yield and EMBI spreads.
b Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago.
c Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Peru, Jamaica, Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Uruguay.
d MSCI Latin America index in local currency.
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In this setting of debilitated funding sources, domestic credit to the private sector 
remained moderate on average in the region, with a year-on-year rate of growth close 
to 4% in real terms, a 15-year low. In Brazil, lending has been flat since late 2015, with 
a sharp contraction in mortgage lending and directed credit as a result of restrictions 
on public-sector bank lending. In Peru, Colombia and Mexico, however, lending 
expanded, with growth rates over 11% in real terms in Peru and Colombia and of 6% 
in Mexico.
The global shocks discussed above had an adverse effect on the activity of the Latin 
American economies in the second half of 2015 and in the first few months of 2016. The 
one with the greatest impact was probably the further fall in the oil price (and in the prices 
of other commodities), which affected mainly countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Mexico and Brazil, through a significant decline in nominal exports and government 
revenues, and also raised doubts regarding the financial situation of the major oil 
companies. From the local viewpoint, there was a notable worsening of the political 
uncertainty in Brazil, which has hampered the adoption of the economic policy measures 
required to correct its significant fiscal imbalance. Brazil is a relatively closed economy, 
which limits the scope of potential cross-border spillovers, but its size and the scale of the 
fall in activity have meant that the adverse impact on its main regional trading partners 
(Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) has been marked.
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The fall in GDP in 2015 stemmed from the negative behaviour of investment (across the 
region), which intensified in the second half of the year, as well as from the weakness of 
private consumption in some countries. The contraction of gross capital formation linked 
to the drop in commodity prices, the decline in capital inflows and the fall in confidence 
reduced investment-to-GDP ratios to below 20%, their lowest levels for ten years. Private 
consumption, meanwhile, fell at unprecedented rates in Brazil (-4%) and Venezuela (-7.8%) 
(countries with high inflation, weak labour markets and political uncertainty), but showed 
greater strength in Mexico, Colombia and Peru, where it grew by around 3%.
The adjustment of domestic demand (which contracted in Brazil and Venezuela, and 
slowed in the rest of the countries) and the competitiveness gain from exchange rate 
depreciation are bringing about a rebalancing of spending in the region, in terms of a 
broadly positive contribution of net external demand to growth (of 2.5 pp in 2015 Q4, see 
Chart 4). This positive contribution was chiefly a result of the contraction in imports (-8.9% 
year-on-year in Q4), while exports began to recover gradually (7.9%) in Brazil, Peru and 
also, despite some fluctuation, in Chile. In principle, the cumulative real exchange rate 
depreciation over the last five years should have had a stronger impact on exports. 
However, the limited diversification of the production of most Latin American countries, 
the weakness of the recovery in the world economy and the smaller gain in competitiveness 
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relative to regional trading partners (whose exchange rates also depreciated) have reduced 
the power of this channel. That said, the improvement in competitiveness offset, to some 
extent, the impact of the fall in commodity prices on the balance of payments and the 
significant increase in the external deficit entailed.
In fact, the current-account deficit of the region, as measured in US dollars, tended to 
narrow in 2015, a change with respect to previous years. This correction was not reflected 
in the deficit measured relative to GDP (the aggregate deficit of the five countries with 
inflation targets increased to 3.5% in 2015), due to the fall in nominal GDP. By country, the 
most marked correction in 2015 took place in Brazil, where the deficit narrowed to -3.3% 
of GDP in 2015. By contrast, countries like Colombia (where the current-account deficit 
widened to -6.5% of GDP), Venezuela (-5.6%) and Peru (-4.4%) continue to show 
heightened external vulnerability (see Chart 5).
A key factor when assessing how resilient domestic demand will be in the coming months 
in Latin America is the labour market situation. Recent labour market developments have 
continued to show deep cross-country disparities, similar to those observed in relation to 
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activity. In Brazil, indicators showed a significant deterioration: the unemployment rate 
rose by 3 pp between the beginning of 2015 and February 2016, to reach 8.2% of the 
labour force, job losses in the formal sector of the economy intensified (except in the case 
of self-employment) and the decline in real wages steepened (to -5%). In addition, the 
labour force tended to increase, interrupting the downward trend that had prevailed since 
2011, associated with the increase in secondary education and the less immediate need 
during the boom years for household members to enter the labour force as soon as 
possible. By contrast, in Chile, Peru, Colombia and Mexico unemployment rates remained 
close to their historic lows, against the background of a labour market that performed 
favourably and better than GDP.
The higher-frequency indicators generally show a relatively weak economic performance 
at the start of 2016. The decline in industrial production has accelerated, largely due to 
developments in Brazil, while in countries such as Peru and Colombia these indicators 
have strengthened. Retail sales have continued to moderate and household and business 
confidence indicators seem to have stabilised, but at very low levels. The growth estimates 
for 2016 Q1 obtained from short-term forecasting models point to very moderate quarterly 
growth rates in Mexico (0.3%-0.4%), more buoyant rates in Chile (a quarterly rate of 1.3%), 
and a further – albeit more moderate – contraction of GDP in Brazil (at a quarterly rate of 
-0.5%). The recent behaviour of market indicators points to an improvement in sentiment 
towards the region, in line with other emerging countries.
Despite the cyclical weakness, inflation stood at around 6.5% in the five countries with 
inflation targets in 2015 Q4. In Venezuela inflation was above 170% and in Argentina above 
30% (10.4% according to the official figures). Inflation surprises were one of the distinctive 
features of macroeconomic developments in Latin America in 2015. For the first time in ten 
years only one country, Mexico, achieved its inflation target, while Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Peru recorded end-year inflation rates above their target ranges (see Table 2). In 
addition, in Brazil and Colombia, the deterioration in inflation expectations was very 
marked in the second half of 2015 (see Chart 6). Against this background, there were 
widespread official interest rate increases, and in Brazil, where the upward cycle started 
earlier, the Selic rate remained stable at a high level from the middle of the year. Inflation 
developments and how they relate to exchange rate appreciation, are analysed in greater 
detail in the third section.
The adjustment of fiscal policies to a scenario of lower commodity prices continued in 
most cases. In Brazil, however, the fiscal adjustment envisaged for 2015 was not 
implemented and the budget deficit stood at 10.4% of GDP at the end of 2015, as a 
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND 
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SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a March 2016 Consensus Forecast for the end of the year.
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consequence of the fall in revenues and the sharp increase in the cost of debt. It has continued 
to widen since, reaching 11% in February 2016, when the primary deficit was -2.1% of GDP. 
In Peru, the stimulus plan applied caused the fiscal deficit to widen by more than 2 pp, to 
-2.9%. In the other countries budget deficits also increased with respect to their 2014 levels, 
although the targets set at the beginning of the year were met (see Chart 7).
In Chile, Colombia and Mexico fiscal adjustments have been announced for 2016 
(equivalent to 0.2% of GDP in the first case and to 0.7% in the other two). The existence 
of fiscal rules in these three countries has enabled the adjustment of the level of spending 
to the much lower fiscal revenues resulting from the fall in commodity prices to be gradual 
and fiscal policy to have a moderately expansionary stance in recent years. Also, important 
in offsetting the fall in revenues associated with commodity prices (by as much as one 
third in the case of Mexico) have been the fiscal reforms approved in various countries 
(Colombia, Mexico and Chile) with the aim of diversifying public revenue sources. These 
have succeeded in raising receipts, mainly through personal and corporate income taxes, 
by between 1 and 3 pp of GDP. In any event, the continued decline in commodity prices 
and the need to meet structural deficit stabilisation targets in the medium term will make 
fiscal policy less expansionary in 2016. A cut in public spending has also been announced 
in Venezuela.
SOURCES: Datastream.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, as a regional GDP-weighted average.
FUENTES: Bloomberg,
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In Brazil, in line with the foregoing, the fiscal consolidation targets have been successively 
relaxed (from a primary surplus of 0.5% to a deficit of -1.6% in 2016). Public spending cuts 
have been announced, but the proposed pension system reform, the establishment of a 
spending limit without the endorsement of parliament, the fragile the political situation, the 
debt dynamics (with an implicit interest rate of more than 12%) and the deep recession 
make for a worrying fiscal outlook.
The growth outlook for the region in 2016 has not only been revised downwards in 
recent months, but also is subject to downside risks. The cross country heterogeneity 
continues to exist: according to the central scenario, Chile, Colombia and Mexico will 
record sustained growth, although at lower rates than in 2015; Peru is the main 
exception, since growth is expected to be somewhat stronger than last year; by contrast, 
the recession may continue in Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina. Inflation may begin to 
subside, reflecting the delayed effect of the tightening of monetary and, in some cases, 
fiscal policies. From an external viewpoint, the main risks arise from the possibility of a 
further fall in commodity prices, the instability that may be generated by the economic 
adjustment process in China, or from a less gradual than expected tightening of global 
financial conditions. The fiscal and external vulnerability displayed by some economies 
are the main domestic risk factors. However, if the recent recovery in Latin American 
financial markets and the change in the trend of capital flows continue, the authorities 
may have more room for manoeuvre.
The exchange rate essentially determines consumer prices in open economies. The price 
of the local currency directly influences the prices paid by consumers for imported 
consumer goods. It also has an indirect influence since it affects the prices of goods 
manufactured in the country through imported intermediate goods and the prices of 
domestic products which compete with imports. The connection between the exchange 
rate and domestic prices - the so-called Exchange Rate Pass-Through - has received 
considerable attention in economic literature and is an important factor that should be 
taken into account by monetary and exchange rate policymakers. To the extent that a high 
degree of pass-through is associated with a less credible monetary policy, it is key to 
perceive correctly both the scale and the persistence of the effect of depreciation on 
The pass-through of 
exchange rate 
depreciation to inflation in 
Latin America.
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domestic prices. The case of Latin America is particularly interesting since the bouts of 
depreciation in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in high inflation rates, which is currently 
happening again to some extent against a backdrop of globally low inflation rates.
In fact, since 2014 Q1, inflation in the aggregate of the five Latin American countries with 
inflation targets rose by around 2 pp, albeit with significant cross‑country variations. In 
Brazil and Colombia it rose by 4.6 pp and 4 pp, respectively, while in Peru and Chile it 
climbed by 0.7 pp and 0.9 pp, respectively; in Mexico, by contrast, it fell by 1.9 pp. Indeed, 
except for Mexico, price developments in 2014 and 2015 were marked by upward inflation 
surprises. In Chile, Colombia and Brazil, expectations were systematically lower than the 
inflation figure finally observed; furthermore, since early 2015 expected inflation ranges 
widened, indicating greater uncertainty.
Certain idiosyncratic factors contributed to exerting upward pressure on domestic prices 
in this period. For instance, there were significant increases in inflation: in Brazil owing to 
the rise in certain administered prices; in Colombia due to higher food prices on account 
of problems with crops; and in Chile, albeit to a lesser degree, because of higher indirect 
taxes. Mexico, once again, is the exception since the structural reforms introduced by the 
government (in particular, the telecommunications and energy reforms) helped to reduce 
inflationary pressures significantly.
However, in this respect, in the last two years, global factors have substantially influenced 
inflation in the region. The ongoing depreciation of the main Latin American currencies 
against the dollar since 2011 - which stepped up in 2013, in certain cases, with the 
announcement of the normalisation of monetary policy in the United States - was one of 
these factors. For example, the Colombian peso and Brazilian real depreciated against the 
dollar by 36% and 43%, respectively; the depreciation against the dollar of the nominal 
exchange rates of other countries with inflation targets averaged 30% (see Chart 2). 
Conversely, the sharp fall in oil prices as from 2014 Q4 had a downward impact on 
consumer prices in certain countries, although in most it was offset by the depreciations. 
Lastly, in certain countries production was below potential which may have alleviated the 
intensity of the inflationary pressures3.
Given the positive correlation between upward inflation surprises and exchange rate 
depreciations in the region since 2014, this section analyses the contribution of exchange 
rate depreciation to inflation in four of the five countries in Latin America with inflation 
targets, differentiating between the effect of an increase in the pass-through - associated 
with a loss of monetary policy credibility - and the effect arising from the scale of the 
depreciation. In fact, the intensity of the exchange rate adjustment was one of the main 
reasons given by central banks in the region for raising their benchmark interest rates.
In order to evaluate the pass-through of depreciation to consumer prices, the same 
regression model was estimated for the four countries, with five-year rolling windows. It is 
a standard empirical approximation where inflation depends on exchange rate depreciation 
and a set of control variables which approximate internal costs and pressure from demand 
in line with the papers of Campa and Goldberg (2005) and of Gopinath and Rigobon (2008). 
The specification is as follows:
3  However, certain recent papers suggest that improvements in the anchoring of inflation expectations have 
tended to ease the reaction of inflation to temporary output gaps. See, for example Moccero et al. (2011) and 
BIS (2014).
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where, ∆p is annual inflation, ∆E is the rate of change in the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate against the dollar, ∆D denotes the change in domestic demand, approximated by the 
countries’ monthly economic activity indexes (for example, the general economic activity 
index ‑ IGAE by its Spanish abbreviation ‑ for Mexico), ∆i  is the change in the official 
interest rate and finally, ∆comm_p is the commodity prices index. The coefficient γ 
associated with the change in the exchange rate measures the degree of pass-through of 
exchange rate changes to domestic prices. The equations were estimated with a sample 
of monthly data for the period between January 2000 and February 2016.
As can be seen in Chart 8, the pass-through accumulated in one year averages 8% for the 
set of countries analysed. However, the estimations show substantial dispersion across 
countries from 1% in Mexico to 12% in Chile as well as considerable fluctuations over 
time. These estimations of the exchange rate pass-through are lower than those in other 
papers, such as Albali et al. (2015), who places it at an average of 19% for the five countries 
in Latin America with inflation targets. Certain methodological aspects may explain the 
differences: for example, considering the multilateral exchange rate instead of the bilateral 
exchange rate against the dollar or the different set of control variables included in the 
inflation equation. The sensitivity of results to the methodological approach used means 
that the results of the analysis should be considered with caution. With this safeguard, the 
findings reject that the pass-through tended to increase in recent years in the countries 
analysed but, on the contrary, a slight downward trend was shown in some of them. 
Consequently, if the effect of the exchange rate depreciation on inflation was greater in 
recent quarters, it is estimated that it was not due to a stronger pass-through but to greater 
currency depreciation.
The differences in the size of the pass-through, together with the varying scale of the 
depreciations recorded explain the different impact of exchange rate movements on 
developments in inflation in each country. Chart 9 shows the contribution of the recent 
bout of currency depreciation to inflation surprises, calculated on the basis of the inflation 
model estimated. The contribution was highest in Chile and Colombia. In Chile, the country 
with the highest exchange rate pass-through of those analysed, the exchange rate 
th–t,t12h–t,th–t,t12
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depreciation accounts for approximately 2  pp of the inflation observed in the last two 
years, a period in which this variable fluctuated between 4% and 6%. In Colombia, 
although the pass-through is significantly lower, the scale of the depreciation against the 
dollar (36% since early 2014) explains the high contribution of this factor of around 1.5 pp 
to the inflation rate of 7.5%. In both cases, without the contribution of the exchange rate 
to domestic prices, it is estimated that the inflation targets set by the central banks would 
have been achieved in 2014 and in 20154.
In the case of Brazil, a high percentage of the goods included in the CPI are regulated, 
which possibly explains the lower estimated response rate of inflation to the exchange 
rate. Regulated prices rose substantially from 2015 as part of the fiscal consolidation 
undertaken and coincided with a sharp depreciation of the real against the dollar.  That 
said, the inflation rate on tradeable goods also climbed rapidly to 9.8% in March 2016 (its 
peak since 2003). The estimates obtained show that the exchange rate depreciation would 
explain only 0.6 pp of the inflation rate during the year and a half (a period in which it 
ranged from 8% to 10%), suggesting that a more thorough analysis of this effect is needed. 
In any case, it should be remembered that the import content of household consumption 
in Brazil is relatively low and averaged 8% between 1997 and 2012 according to data from 
input-output tables.
4  In both cases: 3% per year with fluctuation bands of +/- 1%.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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Finally, in keeping with other papers the pass-through rate of exchange rate fluctuations to 
consumer price inflation is statistically zero in Mexico.5 Thus, notwithstanding the notable 
depreciation of the Mexican peso in the last two years, it is estimated that its contribution 
to inflation would have been zero.
In short, the recent depreciations of Latin American currencies are exerting pressure on 
consumer goods inflation, except for in Mexico. The analysis presented here seems to 
indicate that this contribution of exchange rate movements to inflation is not as responsive to 
an increase in the exchange rate pass-through as it is to the intensity of the depreciations in 
the region’s currencies against the dollar. Furthermore, other idiosyncratic factors have 
affected price developments (domestic food prices, regulated prices, indirect taxes, structural 
reforms, etc.) In any event, the scope and persistence of the recent bout of depreciation in 
Latin America could lead to increases in the exchange rate pass-through to inflation and, 
consequently, this process will require close monitoring by central banks in the region.
Following the 2001 crisis, Argentina embarked on a phase of rapid economic expansion, 
with average annual GDP growth close to 7% between 2005 and 2011. However, since 
2011, the economy has slowed significantly, with GDP growth rates falling to below 1.5%. 
Also, in recent years, the economy’s main macroeconomic strengths, the “twin surpluses” 
(fiscal and external), have waned. Public finances posted a surplus of 0.2% of GDP in 
2010, which, in 2015, became a deficit of 4.2%. The external accounts fell by more than 
2 pp, with a deficit of -2.7% of GDP in 2015 (see Chart 10).
These developments were influenced by a series of external factors, such as the fall in 
commodity prices and the lack of international financing as a result of the blocked payments 
of Argentina’s foreign debt owing to the “holdouts”6 dispute. Thus, against a background of 
strong growth in public spending, with subsidies and State aid more widely available, the 
budget deficit had to be largely financed through monetary financing, which led to a rise in 
inflation from 20%-40%, according to available private-sector estimates. Also, the loss of 
competitiveness abroad, the much overvalued official exchange rate and the impossibility of 
raising external funding severely drained international currency reserves, which required the 
introduction of exchange controls (the so-called “foreign exchange trap”), and curbed 
imports. The restricted access to dollars and the misalignment of the official exchange rate 
gave rise to a parallel foreign exchange market, where the Argentinian peso stood at 
50%-60% below the official rate (see Chart 10). In this environment, there were growing 
concerns as to the reliability of official data on GDP, inflation or unemployment, which did not 
allow an accurate picture of the country’s macroeconomic situation to be had.
The change of government in December 2015 led to a shift in economic policy in five 
fundamental areas. First, priority was given to foreign exchange liberalisation in order to 
correct the overvalued official exchange rate and remove the distortion created by having 
several exchange rates. Along with liberalising imports, this measure provides for the 
adjustment of relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods. Given the risk of 
overshooting, the level of reserves, which stood at $25 billion in December 20157, with only 
Argentina’s new economic 
policy approach: 
assessment and risks
5  Similar findings are obtained by Garcés (2001), Sidaui and Ramos-Francia (2008), Capistrán et al. (2011), Cortés-
Espada (2013) and Guillermo-Peón and Rodríguez-Brindis (2014).
6  This term is used to refer to the creditors who did not participate in the 2005 and 2010 restructured debt swap, 
and in whose cases the New York courts had issued final rulings recognising their right to be paid on the same 
terms (pari passu) as the bondholders who had accepted restructured debt.
7  Of these reserves, somewhat more than $10 billion related to a one-year swap with China, and just over $2 billion 
to the restructured debt payments blocked by the New York courts.
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four months of import coverage, had to be built up first. To this end, the tax on corn, wheat 
and meat exports was removed and the tax on soya exports was lowered by 5 pp, facilitating 
the sale of agricultural crops, which had been constrained owing to the expected exchange 
rate devaluation, and increasing US-dollar income in the free market. Also, the authorities 
negotiated a loan with a group of international banks for approximately $5 billion. All of these 
developments created favourable conditions for announcing the partial withdrawal of 
exchange controls and the transition to a “managed float” exchange rate regime.
Second, the monetary base growth rate, which exceeded 35% at end-2015 owing to the 
need to finance the public sector, slowed down (see Chart 10). Official interest rates rose 
by more than 10 pp, to 38%, meaning the yield curve took on a negative slope, since the 
longer-dated interest rates were based on the expectation that inflation would fall during 
the year. In fact, the Government explicitly established an inflation-targeting framework for 
the coming years, aimed at achieving inflation rates of below 10% by the end of the current 
Government’s term of office.
Third, a gradual approach was adopted to put public finances back on an adjustment 
path. The most significant short-term measures consisted of removing certain energy and 
transport subsidies, which were accompanied by an announcement that there would be 
income tax cuts and other expansionary fiscal measures. Although this has driven the 
SOURCES: National statistics, Thomson Reuters, Central Bank of Argentina and Dirección General de Estadística y Censos de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires.
a Estimate.
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deficit up in the short term, by slightly over 1 pp of GDP, it also implies a structure of 
government revenue and spending that is less likely to distort private-sector decision-
making, and is thus more conducive to economic growth. In this setting, the Government 
also announced a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan which would include annual 
decreases of 1.5 pp in the fiscal deficit until 2019, although no specific saving measures 
beyond 2016 were specified.
Fourth, the Government sought to restore access to foreign capital markets, reaching an 
agreement with the “holdouts”. This agreement, which has already been approved by the 
legislative chambers, includes the repeal of laws that prevented payment to bondholders 
(see Box 1) and will require the issuance of bonds for around $12.5 billion on the domestic 
and international markets.
Lastly, the Government undertook to meet international quality standards on economic 
statistics. This is fundamental not only for decision-making but also for gauging the 
effectiveness of the measures adopted and to raise international credibility. In this respect, 
the new statistics on national accounts, inflation, public finances and the external sector 
have already been published or will foreseeably be so in the coming months.
Some of these measures are similar to those adopted in January 2014 by the previous 
Government when, as a result of the sharp fall in international reserves, a major devaluation 
of the official exchange rate was announced, along with higher interest rates and the 
intention to renegotiate outstanding debts subject to international litigation, leading 
ultimately to the agreement with the Paris Club in April 2014. However, the maintenance of 
exchange controls and import restrictions and, more importantly, the scant credibility of 
the reforms, resulting from the lack of measures to redress the fiscal imbalance, prevented 
delivery of the intended effects.
The current package of measures adopted by the new Government has been received with 
optimism in the financial markets. Although the exchange rate has depreciated substantially 
(see Chart 10), there has been no overshooting and nor have significant adverse effects 
been noted (such as prices spiralling upwards or massive capital outflows). In fact, the 
adjustment process has been moderate and orderly, bearing in mind the country’s external 
vulnerability. The sovereign risk premium has fallen significantly, despite the unfavourable 
context of international financial markets, with widening sovereign debt spreads in the 
emerging economies, particularly those in Latin America (see Chart 11); currently, the 
sovereign spread is at levels similar to Brazil (slightly over 400 bp), although the default 
record of the two countries differs greatly.
The culmination of the foreign exchange liberalisation process has managed to erase the 
gap between the official and parallel exchange rates, which was a source of major distortions 
for the economy, while also providing access to international capital markets. Following 
these initial steps, the Government’s priority will be to control inflation. In this respect, given 
that the immediate effect of the currency’s depreciation, along with the elimination of 
subsidies and the increase in regulated tariffs, has been inflationary, monetary policy will 
foreseeably remain restrictive.  From this standpoint, wage increases set under collective 
bargaining are key to achieving inflation targets, and are a most significant indicator of 
agents’ confidence in the effectiveness of policies to check inflation expectations. 
As regards economic activity, the expected inflow of foreign capital, in an economic setting 
more conducive to private investment, to improving infrastructures in the medium term 
Assessment and risks
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and to greater financial development (bank lending to the private sector accounts for 15% 
of GDP, the lowest level in the region), should provide a boost to the long-term growth rate. 
The aim would be to draw closer to the foreign investment ratios of the countries in the 
region, attracting external financing. This process might be hampered in the coming years 
by the foreseeable tightening of financing conditions for the emerging economies, against 
the backdrop of the normalisation of monetary conditions. More generally, it is not to be 
expected that the external environment will be a major underpinning of activity in the short 
term, chiefly owing to the weakness of Brazil, its main trading partner (and that of other 
neighbouring countries), which will check manufacturing exports and, in particular, those 
from the automobile industry (see Chart 11).8 Further, the low prices of primary exports, in 
particular soya, will reduce foreign currency earnings. Conversely, Argentina may be 
expected to be less affected than other Latin American economies by the ongoing 
rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards sectors more closely linked to consumption, 
as it is not an exporter of mining products. 
SOURCES: Datastream and Global Competitiveness Index.
a Scores range from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest).
ARGENTINA: MARKET REACTION AND GROWTH CHALLENGES CHART 11
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Sep-14 Dec-14 Mar-15 Jun-15 Sep-15 Dec-15 Mar-16
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL
1 NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE AGAINST THE DOLLAR
Sep 2014 = 100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Jan-15 Mar-15 May-15 Jul-15 Sep-15 Nov-15 Jan-16 Mar-16
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL
 LATIN AMERICA  EMERGING ECONOMIES
2 ARGENTINE SOVEREIGN SPREAD AND COMPARISON WITH EMERGING 
COUNTRIES
bp
Institutions
Infraestructure
Macroeconomic 
environment
Healthcare and 
primary education
Higher education and 
training
Goods market 
efficiencyLabour market 
efficiency
Level of development 
of financial markets
Technological 
readiness
Market size
Business 
sophistication
Innovation
-1
1
3
5
7
 ARGENTINA  LATIN AMERICA
3 GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX PILLARS OF ARGENTINA (2015-2016): 
SCORES AND COMPARISON WITH LATIN AMERICA (a)
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
 INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OF ARGENTINE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
 EXPORTS TO BRAZIL
4 ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: EXPORTS AND AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
% y-o-y
8  Land transport equipment exports to Brazil account for around 30% of Argentina’s total manufacturing industry 
exports.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2016 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: FIRST HALF OF 2016
In terms of fiscal policy, mention should be made of the country’s low level of debt from an 
international standpoint (public debt accounted for 43% of GDP in 2014, 61% of which 
was held by public agencies, and external debt was 27% of GDP, half of which related to 
the public sector). Nonetheless, the path of the budget deficit is a major risk to fiscal 
sustainability. Insofar as deficit financing should cease to be based on monetary financing, 
with access to international markets, inflation might decline, lessening the upward pressure 
on local interest rates. 
Unknowns remain regarding the performance of the Argentine economy in this transition 
scenario, owing principally to the local recessionary scenario, the recent increase in 
consumer prices and a complex external environment for the country, given the situation 
of its main trading partners. However, the medium-term outlook will improve to the extent 
that more predictable institutional arrangements are set in place, that the economy opens 
up to international markets and that there is political readiness to reduce the imbalances 
that have built up.
19.04.2016.
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BOX 1 EXTERNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT IN ARGENTINA
Argentina has reached an agreement with the main funds that were in 
litigation in the case of the holdouts, a dispute that dates back to the 
debt restructurings of 2005 and 2010 and that triggered the country’s 
decline into selective default at the end of 2014 when the courts 
blocked the restructured debt payments. The agreement entails a 
reduction of some 25% in the amounts recognised (principal plus 
interest) in favour of the creditors, in a final judgment from the New 
York courts, while for all other creditors it stipulates payment of 100% 
of principal plus 50% of principal in the form of interest. If all 
bondholders involved in litigation (including court cases in various 
jurisdictions and claims in various currencies) accept the agreement, 
the Government estimates that the payments would amount to 
approximately $11.7  billion. For the agreement to be valid, the 
Government has had to repeal legislation approved by its predecessors 
that prevented payments being made on conditions other than those 
envisaged in the debt restructurings in 2005 and 2010.
In this respect, the settlement of the dispute involves significant 
differences in treatment from some creditors to others, both 
among the holdouts and among those who took up the 
restructurings offer1, and those who did not. Thus, depending on 
the jurisdiction in which the dispute was lodged and on the time 
involved, creditors will receive a return on the principal of the debt 
that may differ substantially. Accordingly, the resolution of the 
conflict entails a return for the strategy of the holdouts that may 
impact future debt restructuring processes if the bonds do not 
include the necessary safeguard clauses.2
1  In the restructurings in 2005 and 2010, the offer made to creditors 
included a haircut on the principal together with non-recognition of the 
interest accrued following the default.
2  See “Report on the Latin American Economy: Second Half of 2014”, 
Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, October 2014.
